On June 2, US Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy traveled to the Nuarak Liberty International Airport to celebrate the reopening of the runway 4 -22R. It was unusual: Some holes of the runway are quite glamorous to guarantee a visit to the airport’s CEO, leaving the cabinet secretary. But as we reported last month, some airports have symbolized the same neurological symbol in the USDOT’s air traffic control system.
The purpose of the event and the press conference was to transform Nevarak into a different symbol. In his speech, Duffy was able to solve neovarak problems, and people were kept on stage-which includes Chris Rochelo, the acting Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Scott Kirby, and several other honorees.
Simultaneously, they will get union labor to rebuild the runway in 47 days instead of 60. He agreed to accelerate Verizon a new fiber optic cable. They identified and determined the “system malfunction”, which caused the Nevarak air traffic controllers to be blind and unable to talk to pilots for several terrifying minutes.
Due to this whirlwind of this activity, Rochao expected that Nevarak would soon be able to increase its flight volume by 25 %, or 12 additional flights per hour.
Or, as Kirby said, “This is an important turning point not only for a nearby period but also for the long -term newcomer.”
Within two days, the three people proved to be wrong. On the evening of June 4, the lack of air traffic controllers forced the Nevarak to issue a ground stop, which delayed more than 100 flights for several hours. Another delay on the staff was four days later. Only hopefulness cannot solve infrastructure problems that have been decades for decades.
Especially when they are much wider than most people’s feelings. In addition to the three -day crisis in Nevarak – April 28, May 1, and May 9 – at least a dozen incidents have occurred where goods or staff problems have been significantly affected at air traffic control centers this year.
The most serious events took place in Kansas City in January, air traffic control facilities, Okland in February and in Denver in May. Each time, controllers were unable to watch or communicate with pilots after radar and radio failures. Denver’s closure lasted for only 90 seconds, but the other remained for more than an hour. Each one resulted in extensive delay and cancellation.
At Thorgid Marshal Airport (BWI) in Baltimore in March, the power fire stopped “overloaded old equipment” for more than two hours, causing 50 flight cancellations and delayed more than 150.
And twice this year, the FAA’s air missions (NOTam) system notes-which is a real-time database of each flying hazer and traffic advisory that covers US airspace fully-has gone down for several hours at a time, causing more than 1,300 delay.
This is not just the technology that is causing problems. FAA is less than 3,000 air traffic controllers nationwide. Due to this shortage, numerous air traffic control facilities have been forced to release “staff stimulations”, which reduces the number of flights to their airspace to adjust the low controller level. The staff stimulations have occurred twice for Austin, the regional airports around New York, and this year at Chicago, Los Angeles, and Miami, once aerial traffic control facilities have occurred twice, at regional airports around New York.
Even this air traffic control system cannot present the whole picture of the depth and expansion of the crisis. The list includes only incidents that have been reported by local news, or can be recovered at the FAA’s Air Traffic Control System Command Center (ATCSCC) Advisory Database – this is a system that clears most suggestions after two weeks.
To put in this context, 162 days have passed so far in 2025. At least 16 days of these days – one in 10 – a large part of the air traffic system failed somewhere in the United States.
A recent report by the Government Accountability Office since September 2024 shows that 90 % of the country’s major air traffic control infrastructure is due to the “technology refresh” or due to the past. Almost half of the 138 system surveyed was considered “unstable” or “potentially unstable” due to inadequate maintenance skills, inadequate maintenance skills, or even spare parts. (For example, the 2023 FAA review revealed that airplanes use more than 700 bacons with air and aircraft tracking systems on earth, which are over 20 years old, and whose manufacturers no longer make spare parts).
The FAA has been aware of this problem for decades. In 2003, the agency began to scope the “next generation” air traffic control system. This Next Gene system will replace the existing infrastructure that was “developed in the 1940s and 1950s … and was no longer able to handle air traffic,” and will be delivered to 2025.
But the year of delivery has arrived, and the Next Jain is still mainly on paper. The agency has yet to achieve its minimum target of launching every major Next Gene system at the same major airport by 2025, leaving “full implementation”, which was actually promised by the end of the year. Some delicate systems may not be online by 2030, including a change in the air -to -ground communication system that has failed in Nevarak, Denver and anywhere else.
Air traffic controllers are still asked to maintain the same level of safety that is beyond decades, despite using such goods. But they are not being supported. The majority of air traffic control centers are lower than the staff level. More than half of the target does not meet the “FAA Standard” less than 85 % of the staff level. To compensate, controllers often need to work six days a week, 10 hours a day. An air traffic controller on the Reddate described it as “the worst time to become the US ATC since 1981 – the year the air traffic controllers went on strike for better wages, and President Ronald Reagan responded by firing more than 11,000.”
On May 8, Secretary Duffy unveiled the “Exactly the New Air Traffic Control System Plan”, which contains eight pages “re -investing in the national airspace system.” While the ambitions are present, the details are not decisive. Issues will require these complex people for many years of permanent funding, political support, and proper management and administration. This combination of factors has not existed since the early 2000s, if really ever.
So when secretary duffy is right to acknowledge the work done to overcome the new and nationwide problems, it has to be a long journey right now – and no silver pill that can fix two decades of neglect.
